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Ersatzism vs Ersatzer - What's the difference?

ersatzism | ersatzer |

In metaphysics|lang=en terms the difference between ersatzism and ersatzer

is that ersatzism is (metaphysics) the doctrine that only one concrete world exists, and all other possible worlds are abstract while ersatzer is (metaphysics) a proponent of ersatzism, the doctrine that possible worlds are merely abstract and do not have the same reality as the present world.

As nouns the difference between ersatzism and ersatzer

is that ersatzism is (metaphysics) the doctrine that only one concrete world exists, and all other possible worlds are abstract while ersatzer is (metaphysics) a proponent of ersatzism, the doctrine that possible worlds are merely abstract and do not have the same reality as the present world.

ersatzism

English

Noun

(-)
  • (metaphysics) The doctrine that only one concrete world exists, and all other possible worlds are abstract
  • *{{quote-journal, 2008, date=April 25, Mark Heller, The Donkey Problem, Philosophical Studies, url=, doi=10.1007/s11098-008-9227-z, volume=140, issue=1, pages=
  • , passage=One of Lewis’s challenges to linguistic ersatzism focuses on the inelimanibility(SIC) of modality in connecting different levels of ontological description. }}

    ersatzer

    English

    Noun

    (en noun)
  • (metaphysics) A proponent of ersatzism, the doctrine that possible worlds are merely abstract and do not have the same reality as the present world
  • *{{quote-book, 1986, David K. Lewis, edition=2001 Routledge ed., On the Plurality of Worlds, page=140, pageurl=http://books.google.com/books?id=mdVur1qVLr8C&pg=PA140&
  • , passage=The ersatzers just do not believe in what I call worlds; and sometimes -- depending on which version of ersatzism we encounter -- I just do not believe in what they call worlds.}}
  • * 1989 , David Malet Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility , page 49] ([http://www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521377803 Cambridge University Press; ISBN 0521377803, 9780521377805)
  • My quarrel with the Ersatzer''''' is perhaps not very deep, and I should not be too distressed if I were forced back to his position. But the quarrel is real. Mere representations of possibilities, which is what the '''''Ersatzer uses, are not to be identified with the possibilities that we seek to represent.
  • * 2006 , Craig Bourne, A Future for Presentism , page 65] ([http://www.oup.co.uk/ Oxford University Press; ISBN 0199212805, 978-0199212804)
  • Now that the metaphysics and semantics have been given for ersatzer' presentism, I should answer one possible objection: ''why'' is it that a certain atomic proposition ''p'' appears in a given ''E''-related time if not because ''it was the case that'' p? But if this is the explanation, if this is how the story ultimately bottoms out, then how is ' ersatzer presentism any better off than Priorian presentism.