Noun

(en noun)

An understanding retained in the mind, from experience, reasoning and/or imagination; a generalization (generic, basic form), or abstraction (mental impression), of a particular set of instances or occurrences (specific, though different, recorded manifestations of the concept).

* '>citation

* {{quote-web

, date = 2011-07-20 , author = Edwin Mares , title = Propositional Functions , site = The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , url = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/propositional-function , accessdate = 2012-07-15 }}

Frege's concepts are very nearly propositional functions in the modern sense. Frege explicitly recognizes them as functions. Like Peirce's rhema, a concept is unsaturated . They are in some sense incomplete. Although Frege never gets beyond the metaphorical in his description of the incompleteness of concepts and other functions, one thing is clear: the distinction between objects and functions is the main division in his metaphysics. There is something special about functions that makes them very different from objects.

* {{quote-magazine, year=2012, month=March-April

, author=(Jan Sapp) , title=Race Finished , volume=100, issue=2, page=164 , magazine=(American Scientist) citation , passage=Few concepts' are as emotionally charged as that of race. The word conjures up a mixture of associations—culture, ethnicity, genetics, subjugation, exclusion and persecution. But is the tragic history of efforts to define groups of people by race really a matter of the misuse of science, the abuse of a valid biological ' concept ?}}

(programming)   In generic programming, a description of supported operations on a type, including their syntax and semantics.

Noun

(mentalities)

A mindset; a way of thinking.

Before he can succeed, he will have to shed the mentality that he can get by without hard work.